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Abstract
Exporters are few￿less than one-￿fth among U.S. manufacturing ￿rms￿and are
larger than non-exporting ￿rms￿about 4-5 times more total sales per ￿rm. These facts
are often cited as support for models with economies of scale and ￿rm heterogeneity
as in Melitz (2003). We ￿nd that the basic Melitz model cannot simultaneously match
the size and share of exporters given the observed distribution of total sales. Instead
exporters are expected to be between 90 and 100 times larger than non-exporters. It is
easy to reconcile the model with the data. However, a lot of variation independent of
￿rm size is needed to do so. This suggests that economies of scale play only a minor
role in determining a ￿rm’s export status. We show that the augmented model also
has markedly di￿erent implications in the event of a trade liberalization. Most of the
adjustment is through the intensive margin and productivity gains due to reallocation
are halved.
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of Texas at Austin, the University of Essex, and UCLA for comments. The views expressed here do not
necessarily re￿ect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. This
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11 Introduction
Exporters represent less than one-￿fth of all U.S. manufacturing ￿rms and are larger than
non-exporters￿total sales per ￿rm are about 4-5 times higher for exporters. 1 These stylized
facts are often cited as support for models with economies of scale and ￿rm heterogeneity.
In Melitz (2003), only larger, more productive ￿rms generate enough net revenues abroad to
cover the ￿xed costs associated with exporting. A key implication is that, in the event of a
trade liberalization, resources will be reallocated toward the more productive ￿rms, raising
the average productivity in the industry.
In this paper we explore the quantitative implications of the Melitz model for the fre-
quency and characteristics of exporters. We focus on the size of exporters since economies
of scale are at the core of the theory in Melitz (2003). According to the basic version of the
Melitz model, we should observe strict sorting by size; that is, the smallest exporter should
be larger than the largest non-exporter. The set of exporters is thus easily characterized
with a cut-o￿ rule in terms of total sales. We use this equilibrium restriction to derive the
quantitative predictions of the theory without having to specify the full model.
We ￿nd that the basic Melitz model cannot simultaneously match the share and size of
exporters in the data given the large skewness observed in the distribution of total sales. 2
Given that exporters are roughly one-￿fth of all ￿rms, strict sorting suggests that exporters
should be concentrated in the top quintile of the ￿rm size distribution. We can thus obtain
the model prediction for the size of exporters by comparing the top quintile ￿rms with the
rest. We ￿nd that the ￿rms below the top quintile are quite small (an average of $740,000
total sales), while the ￿rms in the top quintile are much larger ($70 million on average).
Hence, the basic Melitz model greatly overpredicts the exporter size premium: exporters
should have between 90 and 100 times more total sales than non-exporters.
Of course, we did not expect the strict sorting of exporters to hold exactly in the data.
Melitz (2003) certainly does not intend to preclude the importance of other idiosyncratic fac-
tors, unrelated to size, in the ￿rm’s decision to export. For example, the costs of exporting￿
variable or ￿xed￿may vary from ￿rm to ￿rm.
We proceed to reconcile the model with the data by introducing further ￿rm-level het-
erogeneity. At ￿rst pass we take a latent variable approach so there is no need to specify
which are the additional sources of variation in the export decision￿only that these factors
are independent of ￿rm size. We ￿nd that we need a lot of independent variation in order
to bridge the large gap between the model and the data. This suggests that economies of
scale, as captured by ￿xed costs, are not the main determinant of a ￿rm’s export status.
Importantly, we ￿nd that the large amount of independent variation needed ￿waters
down￿ the core mechanism in the Melitz model. To illustrate this we set up a very simple
1Both facts are documented in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) for the universe of U.S.
manufacturing ￿rms operating in 2002.
2We use the distribution of total sales for manufacturing ￿rms (NAICS code 31-33) as given by the 2002
Statistics of U.S. Businesses of the Census.
1partial equilibrium model based on Melitz (2003). We then explore two versions of the
model. In the ￿rst version productivity is the only source of variation across ￿rms. The
model displays the strict sorting property and, as we discussed above, overstates the size of
exporters. In the second version we assume ￿rms face heterogeneous ￿xed costs. We then
calibrate the distribution of ￿xed costs to match the share and size of exporters. 3 From the
previous discussion, we know we need a huge amount of dispersion in the ￿xed costs. We
then compare the models in the event of a trade liberalization, with trade costs falling by
half.
We ￿nd that, in the aggregate, both models are indistinguishable from a representative-
￿rm model. Free entry ampli￿es the response of exports to a trade liberalization through the
love-of-variety e￿ect. However, ￿rm-level heterogeneity virtually cancels all the ampli￿cation
introduced by free entry.4
Behind the similarities in the aggregates there are large di￿erences in the margins of
adjustment. Critically, the augmented model has only a minor role for the extensive margin.
First, there is much less entry than in the standard Melitz model in response to a fall in trade
costs. We ￿nd that the growth rate of the number of exporters is more than 60% in the strict
sorting version, but only 15% when all of the latent heterogeneity is accounted for. Second,
new and existing exporters have relatively similar size in the latent heterogeneity model.
This stands in marked contrast with the standard Melitz model in which new exporters are
10 to 12 times smaller than the average exporter prior to trade liberalization. The di￿erences
across models are more striking given that both models have very similar implications for
the aggregate trade variables.
We seek to quantify further the role of the extensive margin in both models. To this end
we decompose total export growth in an intensive and extensive margin. In the standard
version the extensive margin accounts for more than 60% percent of the trade growth. Once
we match the size of exporters, the extensive margin accounts for less than 20%. The
muted response of export participation is quite surprising given the Melitz model is by now
considered the workhorse model for the fast-growing literature on the extensive margin.
We also look at the productivity gains due to the reallocation e￿ect across both models.
We ￿nd that the productivity gains due to trade liberalization are halved in the augmented
model. This is perhaps not surprising given the previous results. However, it must be noted
that we miss on the productivity gains due to exit in the domestic market, since ours is
partial equilibrium model and the wage rate￿or more generally, unit costs￿is taken as
given.
3The distribution of ￿xed costs is the only di￿erence between the two models. We use a common value
for all remaining parameters, including those governing the distribution of productivity.
4In a recent paper, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) ￿nd that the ￿rms’ responses to a trade liberalization do
not quantitatively impact the implications for aggregate productivity and welfare in a general equilibrium
model. We must emphasize that ours is a partial equilibrium model, so the o￿setting e￿ects are not due to
factor prices or aggregate demand adjusting in general equilibrium. See also Arkolakis et al. (2008).
2Finally, we explore alternative speci￿cations for the additional heterogeneity. First, we
discuss the presence of small exporters in the data, that is, exporters with few export sales.
This observation has spurred some recent research, most notably Arkolakis (2008). We argue
that, as long as the strict sorting is preserved, the size of exporters will be overstated in the
model. Moreover, we show that introducing latent heterogeneity gives rise to a signi￿cant
fraction of small exporters even with a constant export intensity. We also ask whether the
latent heterogeneity stems from di￿erences across broadly de￿ned industries. If that were
the case, we would ￿nd that the size premium of exporters within each industry would be
closer to the data. Instead, we ￿nd that for each 3-digit manufacturing industry, the implied
size premium remains implausibly large.
We then move to the possibility that the ￿xed costs of exporting are sunk. In this
case there is exporter hysteresis and the particular history of each ￿rm can be the source of
heterogeneity at play. This form of heterogeneity would be compatible with large adjustments
along the extensive margin. We show that sunk costs can easily match the share and size
of exporters. However, it is now the size of the new exporters that presents a puzzle: new
exporters would be signi￿cantly larger than incumbent exporters.
Our paper relates to a growing body of work that studies the extensive margin and its
quantitative implications in open macroeconomic models. In an early contribution, Ruhl
(2003) shows how the extensive margin leads to signi￿cantly di￿erent elasticities in the short
and long run. Ghironi and Melitz (2005, 2007) explore how the dynamics of an international
real business cycle model are shaped by the extensive margin. Alessandria and Choi (2007a,
2008) have instead pursued the implications of sunk costs for trade dynamics and estimates
of trade costs. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) explore how entry in export markets shapes the
innovation decisions of the ￿rms.
We are also not the ￿rst to introduce additional heterogeneity in the Melitz model. Das,
Roberts, and Tybout (2007) estimate a partial equilibrium model with entry and exit for
Colombian data. The estimation assumes a very rich error structure and thus many possible
sources of heterogeneity, including stochastic ￿xed costs. Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007)
report that ￿xed costs are, on average, quite large. Our focus is instead on the dispersion
needed to match the data rather than the point estimates. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz
(2008) also estimate a model of ￿rm heterogeneity and export participation with several
sources of variation.
Some researchers have also extended the Melitz model seeking to explain some particular
facts but without pursuing the quantitative implications of the theory. Johnson (2007) and
Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), among others, consider ￿rm-level variation in output quality
in order to explain the correlation between unit values and distance. Kugler and Verhoogen
(2008) further expand the model to explain the correlation of output and input prices with
plant size observed in Colombia. In a similar setting, Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) talk of
di￿erences in ￿caliber￿ among ￿rms and note that such di￿erences are necessary to break the
monotone relationship between size and export status.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the size of exporters in the basic
Melitz model. Section 3 introduces a latent variable to reconcile the model with the data.
In Section 4 we present a simple structural framework that is ￿exible enough to encompass
strict sorting and additional sources of heterogeneity. The implications of the latent hetero-
geneity are then explored in Section 5. We discuss some alternative speci￿cations for the
heterogeneity in Section 6. We also include a brief discussion on the empirical literature on
the extensive margin. Section 8 concludes.
2 On the Size of Exporters
In the Melitz model, ￿rm i will export only if its foreign sales, net of the associated variable





i  f: (1)
Firms di￿er in their labor productivity or in the quality of goods produced. Either way, more
e￿cient ￿rms can generate more net income abroad and are thus more likely to be exporters.
Hence, the model predicts that exporters are more productive and sell higher quality goods
than non-exporters. Incidentally, more e￿cient ￿rms also sell more in the domestic market,
so exporters are unambiguously larger than non-exporters in terms of total sales. These
qualitative predictions are borne in the data and often cited as support for the Melitz model.
We seek to explore the quantitative predictions of the model on the exporters’ character-
istics. The ￿rst step is to rewrite the entry condition (1) in terms of total sales. Data on
total ￿rm revenue are easily accessible and we can observe a ￿rm’s total sales independently
of whether the ￿rm exports. In the basic Melitz model, there is a tight relationship between
a ￿rm’s total sales and its underlying e￿ciency parameter: a ￿rm with higher productivity
will always have more total sales in equilibrium. Since net income abroad is also strictly
increasing in productivity, we have an increasing, monotone relationship between total sales
and net income abroad￿even if the latter is a counterfactual because the ￿rm does not
export.
We can thus summarize the model’s predictions for the set of exporters with a simple
threshold rule in place of (1): ￿rm i will export only if its total sales ri are above some level
t,
ri  t: (2)
It is immediate that exporters and non-exporters are strictly sorted by size; that is, the
smallest exporting ￿rm has more total sales than the largest non-exporting ￿rm. The value
of the threshold level t is determined in equilibrium and is bound to depend on the model’s
parameters.
We can, though, easily derive the model’s predictions using the share of exporters and
the distribution of total sales observed in the data. The threshold condition (2) implies that
4the share of exporters is equal to the fraction of ￿rms with total sales equal or larger than
t. We have thus that
sx = 1   	r (t);
where 	r is the empirical c.d.f. of total sales, and sx is the fraction of ￿rms with positive
export sales. In other words, we can solve for the (1 sx)th percentile in the distribution of
total sales and obtain the threshold t consistent with the observed share of exporters. We
can then easily compute the truncated mean,







so we can compare the model’s implications for the average total sales for exporters and
non-exporters.
Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) report that only 18% of the U.S. manufac-
turing ￿rms had positive sales abroad in 2002. 5 Exporters, thus, are relatively rare. For the
distribution of total sales we look at the 2002 Statistics of U.S. Businesses of the Census.
Table 1 summarizes the data for manufacturing ￿rms. As is well known, there is an enormous
amount of skewness in the ￿rm-size distribution. The average ￿rm sells $13:2 million, and
yet 45% of the ￿rms sell less than $500;000. In short, there are many, many small ￿rms and
a few very, very large ones.
Size bin Frequency Cumulative Frequency Average sales
0￿$100,000 0.145 0.145 $55,600
$100,000￿$500,000 0.305 0.450 $257,000
$500,000￿$1 million 0.144 0.594 $718,000
$1￿5 million 0.257 0.851 $2.26 million
$5￿10 million 0.060 0.911 $6.84 million
$10￿50 million 0.063 0.974 $19.3 million
$50￿100 million 0.010 0.984 $56.4 million
over $100 million 0.015 1.000 $670 million
All Firms $13.2 million
Table 1: The distribution of ￿rm sales in manufacturing ￿ Census
From Table 1 we see that the 82nd percentile falls somewhere between $1 and $5 million
sales, de￿nitively closer to the latter. This already suggests that non-exporters are expected
to be quite small under strict sorting: ￿rms below $1 million sales average less than $320;000
in sales and would constitute over 70% of all non-exporters. At the same time, exporters
5Exporters are similarly scarce if we look at plants or establishments rather than ￿rms￿see Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), for example. The scarcity of exporters has also been con￿rmed in a
variety of countries.
5will be pretty large. Firms above $1 million average $82 million in total sales and would
represent over 80% of all exporters. We want to be a little bit more precise than this, though.
For the ￿rms within the range of $1  $5 million we do not know the exact distribution: we
assume these ￿rms follow a two-side truncated Pareto distribution, parameterized to match
the average total sales in the range ($2.26 million). 6
We ￿nd that strict sorting by size implies that exporters should sell, on average, between
90 and 100 times more than non-exporters. The exporter size premium remains very large
for whatever distribution one assumes for the ￿rms in the $1 $5 million range. As a check
we computed a lower bound on the exporter’s size by taking all ￿rms with sales between
$1 million and $5 million to be identical, with total sales equal to the bin’s average ( $2:26
million). This would be the smallest exporter size premium compatible with strict sorting
and the data. Even in this case we ￿nd that exporters are predicted to be more than 80
times larger than non-exporters.
How does the implied exporter size premium compare with the data? Bernard et al.
(2007) report that exporters are 4 to 5 times larger than non-exporters. 7 Strict sorting
thus greatly overpredicts the size di￿erences between exporters and non-exporters. Table
2 compares the size of exporters and non-exporters in the model with the data for U.S.
manufacturing ￿rms in 2002. Under the hypothesis of strict sorting, exporters should have,
on average, $70:1 million in total sales￿double what we actually observe. In the model non-
exporters are expected to be very small, just $740;000 in total sales. In the data, though,
there are clearly some non-exporters that are large enough to bring their average total sales
above $8 million.
Data Strict Sorting
Average Sales - Non-exporters $8.1 million $740,000
Average Sales - Exporters $36.4 million $70.1 million
Exporter Size Premium 4.5 95
Table 2: Exporters and non-exporters in the model and the data
The model cannot match the size of exporters and non-exporters even if we allow some
leeway in the fraction of exporters. Table 3 reproduces the previous exercise for di￿erent
assumptions on the fraction of exporters, sx. As we increase the share of exporters, the
model’s prediction for the size premium declines but does not get anywhere close to the
actual number. For example, say we take exporters to be twice as frequent as they actually
6There is no need to assume anything about the distribution of ￿rms outside this size bin: they are all
squarely in the exporter or non-exporter category.
7Table 3 in Bernard et al. (2007) states that the di￿erence in average log shipments between exporters
and non-exporters is 1:48 for the same set of ￿rms we used. The ￿nding that exporters are larger than
non-exporters has also been con￿rmed for plants and establishments, as well as for other countries. The size
di￿erences are all in the range between 4 and 6. In this section, we work with total sales rather than log
total sales so we can use the information in Table 1 without any further assumptions.
6are, sx = :35. The average total sales of exporters is then very close to the data. Non-
exporters, though, are then very small and the size premium is still 15 times larger than in
the data.
Data Strict Sorting
Share of exporters sx .18 .15 .25 .35
Average Sales - Non-exporters $8.1 million $746,000 $637,000 $491,000
Average Sales - Exporters $36.4 million $83.9 million $51.0 million $36.8 million
Exporter Size Premium 4.5 114 89 75
Table 3: Exporters and non-exporters given the share of exporters sx
The lack of ￿t due to strict sorting can also be understood in terms of the conditional
probability of exporting given the ￿rm size. In the basic Melitz model, the conditional
probability is a step function of ￿rm size, taking value 0 if ri is below the cuto￿ t, and one
otherwise. Larger ￿rms are indeed more likely to export in the data, but only a little bit
more. In other words, the conditional probability rises only slowly with ￿rm size in the data,
while it rises very sharply in the model. We ￿nd the di￿erences in the conditional probability
between the model and the data are somewhat harder to summarize and interpret in economic
terms. In addition, any measure of ￿t would depend on the level of detail available in the
data. Computing the exporter size premium in both model and data is easier, plus the
di￿erences are readily stated in economic terms.
We also experimented with a parameterized Pareto distribution for the total sales dis-
tribution. If 	r is Pareto, we have that the cuto￿ t is given by t = (sx)
 1=k where k is the
slope parameter of the Pareto distribution. The unconditional average ￿rm size  can be
decomposed in the conditional averages
 = sxx + (1   sx)nx
where nx and x are the average total sales for exporter and non-exporters respectively.








Estimates of the slope parameter in Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007) are very close to
one. It is thus clear that the term (sx)
1 1=k is very close to one and nx= is bound to be
very small. Axtell (2001) works with k = 1:024, which implies an exporter size premium of
110 under strict sorting. On the upper end of the estimates, a slope parameter k = 1:065
brings the exporter size premium down to 41. It must be emphasized that, while the Pareto
distribution has been documented to ￿t the tail of ￿rm-size distribution, it is not a good
approximation of the size distribution of exporters in the data for the very reason that
7strict sorting overstates the size premium: exporters are not concentrated in the tail of the
￿rm-size distribution. This lack of ￿t with the empirical distribution explains why a Pareto
distribution can imply a lower size premium than our non-parametric lower bound.
3 Introducing Latent Heterogeneity
Of course, we did not expect the strict sorting of exporters to hold exactly in the data. Melitz
(2003) certainly does not intend to preclude the importance of other idiosyncratic factors,
unrelated to size, in the ￿rm’s decision to export. For example, the costs of exporting￿
variable or ￿xed￿may vary from ￿rm to ￿rm. It is possible that a low-productivity ￿rm ￿nds
exporting pro￿table simply because it is quite cheap to transport its product. Alternatively
we could think that whatever makes a product successful in the domestic market does not
always translate into more sales in the foreign market. Clearly, once we consider these
additional factors, the strict sorting of exporters no longer holds.
3.1 Fitting the data
Here we proceed to reconcile the model with the data by introducing the necessary ￿rm-level
heterogeneity in the export decision. We rewrite the threshold condition (2) in terms of a
latent variable, ti. A ￿rm i exports if its total sales satisfy
ri  ti: (3)
The latent variable is identically and independently distributed across ￿rms, with a c.d.f. 	t
over support <+.
With the latent variable condition (3) we can capture all of the underlying heterogeneity
without having to specify the sources of variation. Indeed, the only structure imposed on
the latent variable is that it is independent of ￿rm size. As in the previous section, we
can postpone laying out and solving the structural model while seeing through the model’s
implications given the data.
It is now useful to ￿t the empirical distribution of total sales with a parametric dis-
tribution. We use a lognormal distribution with mean r = 6:3 and standard deviation
r = 2:6￿so we reproduce the average total sales (in thousands of dollars) as well as the
approximated location of the 82th percentile. The use of the lognormal distribution for
￿rm size has a long tradition in economics. See Aitchison and Brown (1969) for a complete
treatment of the distribution.
We also assume that the latent variable ti follows a lognormal distribution. This is mainly
a choice of convenience: we want a ￿exible two-parameter distribution de￿ned over positive
numbers. We pick the mean t and standard deviation t such that the model reproduces
8the share and size of exporters. That is, we solve for t and t such that equations
sx =
Z
	t (r)d	r (r); (4)
E flog(ri)jri  tig =
Z
log(r)	t (r)d	r (r)=sx; (5)
reproduce the observed values for the share of exporters, sx = :18, and the average log total
sales of exporters, E flog(ri)jri  tig = 5:66.8 We use 	t to denote the c.d.f. of the latent
variable distribution.
The latent variable is very dispersed: we ￿nd that the parameter values matching mo-
ments (4)-(5) are t = 13:73 and t = 7:7. These parameters imply that the coe￿cient of
variation of the latent variable is many orders of magnitude larger than for total sales! We
explored an array of parameters for the distribution of total sales and found always that we
need a huge dispersion for the latent variable in order to reproduce the share and size of
exporters. More precisely, we consider values r in the range 5:5   7:5 and r in the range
2   3. The resulting parameters for t and t were always above 10 and 5, respectively.
There also good reasons to view our ￿ndings as a lower bound on the dispersion of the
latent variable. Firms often carry multiple product lines, and there are many foreign markets
to serve. However, it only takes one product to be exported to one destination for a ￿rm
to be called an exporter. Hence, if we think each market/product o￿ers an independent
opportunity to export, we have to see the latent variable ti as the minimum realization
among the ensemble of product- and destination-speci￿c thresholds. Thus, the underlying
distribution from which the product- and destination-speci￿c latent variables are drawn
would feature much more dispersion.
The results are perhaps not that surprising: after all, we have to make up for a large gap
between the model and the data in the size premium of exporters. In order to reduce the size
of exporters we need the latent variable to take very large values with high probability, so
some large ￿rms do not export. Simultaneously, some other ￿rms must draw a low realization
of the latent variable and export independently of their size. 9
8Here we use the log total sales instead of total sales, so the exporter size premium is now given by the
di￿erence in average log total sales between exporters and non-exporters. The change of units has virtually
no implication for the parameters of the latent variable distribution￿but it turns out to be very convenient
for the calibration of the model later.
9It is also necessary to introduce latent heterogeneity in a Melitz model in order to match the dynamic
facts. Entry and exit rates in foreign markets are relatively high, as documented in Bernard, Jensen and
Schott (2007). The volatility of ￿rm employment in the data is clearly too low to explain these high rates
in a basic Melitz model: ￿rms rarely grow or contract enough to start and stop exporting so frequently. See
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) for a discussion.
93.2 The role of ￿rm size
The huge dispersion of the latent variable indicates that size plays only a small role in the
determination of the export status of a ￿rm. We can illustrate this point with a simple
exercise. Note that given a ￿rm size ri, the probability that ￿rm i exports is
Pr(i exports jri) = Pr(ri  tijri)
= 	t (ri):
Given our results for 	t, a ￿rm of median size exports with probability :167, very close to the
unconditional probability of :18.10 In other words, a ￿rm of median size could be taken as
representative of the industry as a whole. In contrast, a ￿rm with the median latent variable
will export only with probability :0016. Table 4 repeats the exercise with the 25th and 75th
percentiles for total sales and the latent variable.
Percentile
Ordered 25th 50th 75th
By total sales :1179 :1674 :2286
By latent variable 10 7 :0016 :1881
Table 4: Conditional probability of exporting
In the next section we will explore the implications of the additional heterogeneity in the
context of a structural model. Here we anticipate our main result with a simple exercise
that illustrates how the predictions for the extensive margin crucially depend on whether we
match the exporter size in the data.
The exercise is as follows: we increase the total sales of all ￿rms by a constant percentage
. We then look at the predictions for the growth rate of the number of exporters for both
models: the strict sorting model given by (2) and the latent variable model given by (3). It
must be emphasized that there is no change either in the threshold or the distribution of the
latent variable.
Table 5 reports the ￿ndings for the growth rate in the number of exporters for revenue
increases of 5%, 10% and 20%. The strict sorting model predicts that a relatively large
fraction of ￿rms change status from non-exporter to exporter. For a 10% increase in total
sales the model predicts a 5:29% growth rate in exporters. The distribution of total sales
is still pretty thick just below the 82nd percentile. Because size is the only determinant
of the export status of a ￿rm, all the ￿rms whose total log sales were originally between
log(t)   log() and log(t) will export after the revenue increase.
In contrast the latent variable model predicts much smaller growth rates for the number
of exporters. For a 10% increase in total revenue, only 2.23% of ￿rms switch export status.
10The median size is given by exp(r) or approximately $600;000.
10Revenue increase 
Model  = 5%  = 10%  = 20%
Strict Sorting 2:69% 5:29% 10:26%
Latent Variable 0:67% 2:23% 3:67%
Table 5: Growth rate of the number of exporters
In Figure 1 we have plotted the distribution (PDF) of normalized log total sales: log(ri) 
log(ti) for both models. Thus, for the strict sorting model we just have the distribution of log
total sales, centered such that the 82nd percentile is equal to zero. The resulting distribution
is plotted as a dashed line. For the latent heterogeneity, normalized log total sales are way
more dispersed, re￿ecting the huge variation in the latent variable. The distribution is
plotted in a solid line.
The key observation in Figure 1 is that the mass of ￿rms close to the threshold is much
larger under strict sorting than in the latent heterogeneity model. Thus, any displacement
of the distribution to the right brings more ￿rms above the threshold in the strict sorting,
as documented in Table 5. In the latent heterogeneity, the gain in size must be quite large
in order to overcome the other determinants of the exporting decision.
4 A Simple Framework of Exports and Exporters
In this section we set up a small model with economies of scale and ￿rm heterogeneity. The
model is simpler than Melitz (2003) in that it is a partial equilibrium model, taking the wage
rate as given. As a result the model abstracts from entry and exit in the domestic market.
We explore the implications of the additional heterogeneity for an episode of trade lib-
eralization. To this end we consider two versions of the model. In the ￿rst, there is strict
sorting, so the model does not match the size of exporters. In the second version, we intro-
duce the needed variation as a random ￿xed cost. The rest of the parameters are common
across models. Finally, we brie￿y sketch three simpler models for comparison purposes.
4.1 Framework
There is a set 
 of ￿rms that produce and sell in the home country. Firms are heterogeneous
in their productivity, denoted ', and the ￿xed costs they face if they start exporting, denoted
f. Productivity and ￿xed costs are independently distributed over <+ with c.d.f. G and H,
respectively. We summarize a ￿rm by its type ! = f';fg. The set of ￿rms 
 (and their
distribution) is taken as a given.
Each ￿rm is the single producer of a di￿erentiated good with technology
y (!) = '(!)l(!)
11where l(!) is the labor demanded by ￿rm !. Consumers in the home country aggregate the












where  2 (0;1) and yd (!) denote the output of ￿rm ! sold in the home country. The









where  = (1   )
 1 is the price elasticity, pd (!) the price set by ￿rm !, and the price index














Firms are monopolistic competitors and internalize the downward sloping demand for







where w is the wage rate. We take the wage rate as exogenously given, so ours is a partial
equilibrium model.
It is clear that only the productivity parameter ' will determine domestic sales. We can
thus write pd (') and yd ('). The c.e.s. demand structure also implies that ￿rm ' revenues

















is the average productivity de￿ned as in Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003). Since we take
both the wage and the distribution of ￿rms in the home country as given, total domestic sales
Rd are also exogenously determined. 11 We will still make use of the relationship between
productivity and domestic sales given by (6).
11Brie￿y, Rd = rd (~ ') by (6), and Pd = w=(~ ') by substituting the price for each good, pd ('). We do
not model the import decision of the domestic households.
12We now move to the determination of exports and exporters. Not all ￿rms export: let 
x
denote the set of ￿rms that do and Mx its measure. We normalize the measure of all ￿rms
to one, so Mx is also the share of exporters. Consumers in the foreign country aggregate the













where yf (!) is the output of ￿rm ! sold in the foreign country. The foreign demand for






























where Y  is the (exogenously given) income of the foreign country, and  is the price elasticity
of aggregate exports of the home country. We assume that  < ; that is, exports of the home
country are closer substitutes of each other than they are of a good produced elsewhere.
Let us ￿rst solve for the export revenues of a ￿rm, taking as given the set of exporters








where  > 1 is an iceberg trade cost associated with exports. It is clear again that, conditional
on exporting, only the productivity parameter ' determines sales.
The c.e.s demand system allows us to write a ￿rm’s export revenues as a function of the





















is the average productivity among exporters. Note that the set of exporters 
x a￿ects
the export revenues of each ￿rm (10), both through the share of exporters Mx and the
productivity distribution within the set.
13Last but most certainly not least, we get to the determination of the set of exporters

x. A ￿rm that exports incurs in a per period ￿xed cost. As a result, a ￿rm ! will ￿nd it




f ('(!))  f (!); (11)
where export net income, that is, export revenues minus costs, is expressed as rf ('(!))=.
Thus the set of exporters 
x is the set of ￿rms ! 2 
 such that the entry condition (11)
holds. However, export revenues depend themselves on the set of exporters, so in equilibrium
exports and exporters are determined simultaneously.
4.2 Strict sorting and latent heterogeneity
We now consider two versions of the model above. In the ￿rst we stick to the basic Melitz
model and shut down the heterogeneity in the ￿xed costs. As a result exporters and non-
exporters are strictly sorted by size and the model inherits the inability to match the size
of exporters as documented in Section 2. We name this ￿rst version of the model after the
strict sorting property. In the second calibration we use the dispersion on ￿xed costs to
reproduce the latent variable distribution we worked out in Section 3. By construction the
model then matches the share and size of exporters. We label this calibration as the ￿latent
heterogeneity￿ model.
It must be emphasized that the only di￿erence between the two models is the distribution
of ￿xed costs. The models will share the same parameter values for the elasticities, trade
costs, and the distribution of productivity. We will also set the exogenous variables such
that both models match the same facts in the data.
We start with the common parameters. We set the elasticity of substitution across
exported goods to  = 8. This number is essentially in the middle of the range of estimates
surveyed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). For the aggregate demand for home exports
(9) we set the price elasticity of  = 6. Our baseline trade costs are set at 50%,  = 1:5. This
is the midpoint between the estimated trade costs in 1987 and 2002 reported by Alessandria
and Choi (2008), and slightly below the ￿ndings in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004). The
levels of the foreign income and the wage rate are set to reproduce the ratio of total exports
to total sales in the industry.
The last common parameter is the distribution of productivity, G. For the calibration we
want to use the observed distribution for total sales. Unfortunately the mapping from the
productivity distribution to the total sales distribution is not the same for both versions of
the model.12 It is thus not possible to have a common parametrization for G that matches the
observed distribution of total sales in both models. However, we do not want any di￿erence
in the calibration of the models to govern the results￿other than the size of exporters, that
12Both models share the mapping from G to the distribution of domestic total sales. The distribution of
export sales, though, are di￿erent for each model.
14is. We thus adopt the following compromise: we set the productivity distribution to capture
all of the variation in total sales. More precisely, we take G to be a lognormal distribution
with standard deviation equal to ' = r=(   1). The location parameter can be set such
that the average productivity ~ ' among all producers is normalized to one.
Table 6 summarizes all of the parameters common to both models.
Parameter Value
Elasticity of Substitution  8
Price-Elasticity exports  6
Trade Cost  1.5
Std.Dev. Log-productivity ' .37
Mean Log-productivity ' -0.48
Table 6: Calibration - common parameters
Finally we get to what makes the strict sorting and latent heterogeneity models di￿erent.
For the strict sorting we shut down all of the variation in the ￿xed cost, so H is a degenerate
distribution at some point f. The value of the ￿xed cost f is set such that the share
of exporters is 18% as in the data. For the latent heterogeneity model we calibrate the
distribution of ￿xed costs H such that we capture all the variation in the latent variable ti.
For this it is very convenient to use a log-normal distribution for ￿xed costs so the mapping is
simple. By construction the latent heterogeneity model replicates the observed exporter size
premium; by appropriate choice of the location parameter, we match the share of exporters
as well. The resulting parameters are f = :98 and f = 7:69.
4.3 Three analytical models
While our analysis is based on the two models just described, we ￿nd it useful to consider
three simpler models for comparison purposes: a representative ￿rm model, a homogeneous
￿rm model, and a heterogeneous-productivity model with a Pareto distribution. In these
three models we can derive the relationship between total exports and trade costs in closed
form. This helps build an intuition about the mechanisms at play in the richer full model.
Representative ￿rm model. There is a representative ￿rm that exports under all cir-
cumstances. In terms of the framework above, we encompass the representative ￿rm model
by having a degenerate distribution of ￿rm productivity and a ￿xed cost equal to zero.
There are, thus, no changes in the measure of ￿rms exporting or the average productivity of
exporters. We express the price of exports (8) in terms of logs,
log(Pf) = log() + const:
15where all terms that are constant are collected in const: Substituting in the aggregate demand
for exports (9) we have the simplest model of exports,
log(Rf) = (1   )log() + const: (12)
We maintain the same value for the price elasticity  given in Table 6.
Homogeneous ￿rm model. We introduce entry by assuming a positive ￿xed cost but
abstract from all heterogeneity: all ￿rms have identical labor productivity and face the same
￿xed cost of exporting. Some ￿rms, though, export, while some others do not. This can be
an equilibrium only if ￿rms are actually indi￿erent between exporting or not, so the entry
condition (11) holds with equality. Since there is no ￿rm heterogeneity, the entry condition
(11) e￿ectively pins down the average export sales,
log(Rf=Mx) = const:
Thus all of the adjustment in this model occurs through entry, since ￿rms do not change
their export intensity in response to trade costs.
Since all ￿rms have identical productivity, there is no change in the average productivity





log(Mx) + log(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log(Mx) + (1   )log() + const:
Finally, we use that log(Rf) = log(Mx)+const to obtain total export revenues as a function
of the trade cost,
log(Rf) =  
(   1)(   1)
   
log() + const: (13)
The assumption that  >  guarantees that the export revenues increase with a fall in trade
costs, as we would expect. We maintain the same value for parameters  and  given in
Table 6.
Heterogeneous-productivity ￿rms with a Pareto distribution. The last of our models fea-
tures heterogeneous ￿rms and an identical ￿xed cost of exporting. The only di￿erence with
the strict sorting model discussed above is that productivity follows a Pareto distribution.
This allows us to solve for the model analytically but has stark implications for the margin
of adjustment, as will be clear very soon.
We now have to simultaneously solve for the export demand (9) and the entry condition
(11). We start with the latter. Assuming that there is a subset of ￿rms that do not export, the
16entry condition must hold with equality. 13 The ￿rm’s export revenues are strictly increasing
in productivity, ', so we can characterize the set of exporters with a simple threshold rule.




f (^ 'x) = f:
The set of exporters 
x is then given by the set of ￿rms '  ^ 'x and thus Mx = 1   G(^ 'x).
Using the c.d.f. for the Pareto distribution we have that
log(Mx) =  k log(^ 'x) (14)
where k is the slope parameter associated with the Pareto distribution.
We now get to use the key property of the Pareto distribution that allows for an analytical
solution. It is easy to show that if ' is distributed according to a Pareto distribution with
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and it is immediate that the average export sales are pinned down by the entry condition,
log(Rf=Mx) = const:
Thus average export sales do not respond to trade costs, so the growth rate in total revenues
equals the growth rate in the number of exporters. 14 This stark implication does not hold
for other productivity distributions.
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log() + const (15)
where the average exports are constant.
13Since the support for the Pareto distribution is unbounded, there is always a ￿rm that ￿nds it pro￿table
to export.
14Note that the export sales per ￿rm increase with a fall in trade costs; however, new exporters are smaller
than incumbents and drive the average down.
175 Trade Liberalization
We compare the two models’ predictions for export growth in response to a fall in trade
costs. The exercise is labeled as a ￿trade liberalization, ￿ but there is no distinction in our
model as to whether it is a tari￿ reduction or an improvement in the shipping technology. 15
We consider a range of trade liberalizations up to a halving of the trade costs￿a fall of 25
percentage points.
5.1 Aggregate response
We ￿nd that both models have virtually identical implications for trade volume. Figure 2
plots the growth rate of di￿erent variables (as a percentage rate) as a function of the fall in
trade costs (in percentage points). The solid and dashed lines correspond to the strict sorting
and latent heterogeneity models, respectively. The top left panel displays the growth rate of
exports. Both models predict that trade will approximately triple once trade costs are cut in
half. The models’ predictions are so similar that the lines are on top of each other for most
of the range of trade costs. The top right panel in Figure 2 displays the growth rate in the
export price index, as given by (8). Again there are no di￿erences between both models, and
the price index falls with trade costs at the same rate for both models. Hence the pro￿le for
export revenues is very similar (bottom left panel). Finally, the bottom right panel in Figure
2 displays total employment in the industry. The trade liberalization results in a sizeable
expansion of employment, about 10% for the largest fall in trade costs considered.
Why do the two models predict such similar aggregate trade patterns? The reason is
that, in this respect, both models are very similar to the representative ￿rm model presented
in Section 4.3. This is quite obvious in Figure 3, where we have added the representative
￿rm model, indicated with a dotted line. We plot export growth (top) and the export price
growth (bottom) as a function of the fall in trade costs. Clearly, all three models are very
similar in both prices and quantities.
It may be puzzling at ￿rst that ￿rm-level heterogeneity and the extensive margin do not
make a di￿erence for aggregate variables. The intuition for this is that ￿rm-level hetero-
geneity essentially cancels the boost in trade due to the extensive margin. We can illustrate
this by comparing ￿rst the representative ￿rm model with the homogeneous ￿rm model and
then with the heterogenous-productivity ￿rm model with a Pareto distribution.
Endogenous entry ampli￿es the response of export revenues to a fall in trade costs. A
simple comparison of the representative ￿rm model (12) and the homogeneous ￿rm model
(13) backs the claim: the elasticity of export revenues with respect to trade costs is aug-
mented by ( 1)=( ), which is always greater than one. Everything else constant, more
exporters bring the aggregate price of exports down through a love-of-variety e￿ect. As long
as there is entry, the price of exports will then fall by more than one-to-one with trade costs
and sustain additional demand for exports. For the choice of parameters reported in Table
15Or, for that matter, an exogenous change in the real exchange rate.
186, the response of trade volume is more than twice as large in the homogeneous ￿rm model
than in the representative ￿rm model.
We now look at the heterogeneous-productivity ￿rm model with a Pareto distribution
to see how the trade response changes with ￿rm heterogeneity. Comparing (15) and (13) it
is clear that the response in trade in the heterogeneous ￿rm model is between those in the
representative ￿rm model and the homogeneous ￿rm model. Which model the heterogeneous
￿rm model resembles the most depends on the slope parameter of the Pareto distribution,
k. As k grows large, the heterogeneous model approaches the homogeneous model and the
export growth is the largest. This is not surprising, since the Pareto distribution becomes
degenerate, with all of the mass at the location parameter.
For low slope parameters k the Pareto distribution features a thick tail. In this case the
response of exports to a fall in trade costs is quite muted. The ￿rms that start exporting
in response to the fall in trade costs are less productive than incumbent exporters. Thus
the average productivity among exporters falls rapidly, which in turn drives the aggregate
price of exports. The more skewed is the distribution of productivity, the faster the average
productivity drops with entry.
Quantitatively, we ￿nd that the heterogeneity cancels virtually all of the ampli￿cation
introduced by entry, rendering the heterogeneous and the representative ￿rm models very
similar in their implications for export growth. We base this assertion on the skewness
of the empirical distribution of total sales. In the model the right tail of total sales is
distributed according to a Pareto with slope parameter k=(   1): The right tail in the
observed distribution of total sales is well approximated by a Pareto with a slope parameter
 in the range 1:02   1:06. Setting k = (   1) we can rewrite the response of exports in












From the above expression it is clear that if  is close to one, then the term (   1)= is
approximately zero and the heterogeneous ￿rm model is very close to the representative ￿rm
model (12).
5.2 Margins of adjustment
Behind the similarities in the response of aggregate trade, the models display marked dif-
ferences in the adjustment in the number of exporters. The top panel in Figure 4 plots
the growth rate in the number of exporters for each model. In the strict sorting model the
number of exporters grows very fast. Entry drives up the number of exporters by almost
60% when trade costs fall by 25 percentage points. Even with a small drop in trade costs,
such as 5 percentage points, the number of exporters grows by more than 10%, suggesting
that even at relatively high frequencies entry could play an important role.
19In contrast, there is not much entry in the foreign market in the latent heterogeneity
model. The growth rate of the number of exporters barely gets over 15%, one fourth of
the growth in the strict sorting model. For smaller trade cost reductions such as 5%, the
number of exporters is very close to ￿at. The similarities for total trade volume only make
the di￿erences in entry even more striking.
We seek to quantify further the role of export entry in both models. We decompose the
growth rate of exports in the change of export intensity and participation,
log(Y
f) = log(r
f) + log(Mx): (16)
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is the intensive margin, that is, the growth rate on the
average export revenues per exporter; and the second is the extensive margin, or the growth
in the number of exporters. We normalize export growth by total sales and express each
margin as a percentage of the total. 16 Table 7 collects the results for trade cost reductions
of 5, 15, and 25 percentage points. In the strict sorting model the extensive margin is more
than 60% of the growth rate in exports. However, entry plays a much more minor role in
the latent heterogeneity model, just below 20%. These numbers are very similar across the
range of trade cost cuts. They are also quite robust to alternative parameterizations for
elasticities. This leads us to the conclusion that the Melitz model is at odds with a large role
for the extensive margin, once it is augmented to account for the share and size of exporters.
Trade Cost Decrease
Model 5 15 25
Strict Sorting 63.3% 63.3% 63.5%
Latent Heterogeneity 19.2% 19.8% 20.4%
Table 7: The role of the extensive margin. Trade Costs decrease in percentage points.
The reader may be wondering how the two models can have such di￿erent entry rates
and yet very similar export growth. The bottom panel of Figure 4 clues us in. Despite
having much lower entry rates, total employment by exporters actually grows much faster
in the latent heterogeneity model. The reason is that new exporters are very di￿erent in
the two models. In the strict sorting model new exporters are very small in comparison
with the incumbent exporters, about 10 times smaller than the average exporter size prior
to trade liberalization.17 This is a direct consequence of the strict sorting: since exporters
are almost 100 times larger than non-exporters, the ￿rm at the threshold is still quite large
compared with non-exporters but, more important, it is very small compared with exporters.
Returning to Table 2 in Section 2, the smallest exporter has about 5 times more total sales
than the average non-exporter, but 18 times less total sales than the average exporter.
16We are following Alessandria and Choi (2008) closely, although we do not distinguish between export
intensity and premium as they do.
17Because previous exporters grow rapidly with the trade liberalization, the new exporters are 50 times
smaller when compared with the average size of the incumbent exporter after trade costs decrease.
20In contrast, new exporters in the latent heterogeneity model are still smaller than existing
exporters, but not by much. For a fall in trade costs of 5 percentage points, new exporters
are just 40% smaller than the average exporter size prior to the trade liberalization. If we
go all the way to a halving of trade costs, new exporters are actually 30% larger than the
average exporter size prior to the trade liberalization. In short, new exporters are not very
di￿erent from the average ￿rm in the industry.
We now evaluate the main mechanism in Melitz (2003), namely, the gains in average









as the aggregate productivity. 18 It must be noted that our model can only do a partial
evaluation. Since we take the wage rate as given, the set of non-exporters does not change
so there are no productivity gains from the exit of the least productive ￿rms as in Melitz
(2003).
We ￿nd that aggregate productivity grows signi￿cantly less in the latent heterogeneity
model than in the strict sorting model. Figure 5 plots the results. Aggregate productivity
growth in the latent heterogeneity model is about half the one in the strict sorting model￿a
ratio that is approximately constant across the range of trade cost decreases.
That productivity gains are smaller is not surprising given our previous results. Given
that we abstract from exit in the domestic market, it can be said that the mechanism
in Melitz (2003) works through the selection and entry of exporters. First, exporters are
more productive than the average ￿rm, so anything that expands the total employment of
exporters will lead to productivity gains due to composition e￿ects. Second, new exporters
experience a large jump on their output, and since they are still more productive than most
￿rms in the economy, also induce gains in aggregate productivity.
Both selection and entry are much weaker in the latent heterogeneity model than in
the strict sorting model. We have seen that strict sorting greatly overpredicts the size of
exporters, that is, their productivity. The latent heterogeneity reconciles the model and data:
exporters are still more productive than non-exporters, but only modestly so. Moreover,
there is much less entry in the latent heterogeneity model, so the second source of productivity
gains is weaker too.
We conclude our analysis with a look at how the average exporter changes with trade
liberalization. Figure 6 displays the average among exporters for export revenues, export
output, average productivity, and total employment. It must be emphasized that the set of
exporters changes as we cut the trade costs. First, we note that export revenues and output
grow much faster in the latent heterogeneity model. This is, of course, the ￿ip side of the
results on the extensive margin documented in Table 7. Second, the average productivity for
exporters falls in both models but by di￿erent amounts, as shown in the bottom left panel in
18Melitz (2003) refers to this as combined average productivity and shows that it completely summarizes
the e￿ects of the distribution of productivity levels on the aggregate outcome.
21Figure 6. In both models new exporters are less productive than incumbent exporters but in
the strict sorting model, they are much less so. As a result the exporter average productivity
drops by a staggering 6%but only a modest 1% in the latent heterogeneity model.
The di￿erences in the average output and productivity of exporters combine for oppo-
site predictions with respect to total employment for exporter. In the strict sorting model
exporters, on average, employ fewer workers as trade costs fall. New exporters do employ
more workers than they did before entering the foreign market. However, they are so small
compared with the incumbent exporters that they bring the average down by an astounding
25%. Recall that the number of exporters grows by more than 50% so entry has a big impact
on averages. In contrast, total employment for exporters grows in the latent heterogeneity
model, as the weaker selection and entry e￿ects cannot overturn the employment gains due
to overall expansion of exports.
5.3 Robustness
We brie￿y discuss here alternative speci￿cations for the common structure of both models.
We start with our choice of the lognormal distribution for ￿rm productivity. In particular,
theory work has favored instead the Pareto distribution for its tractability. 19 It has been
argued that the Pareto distribution is a very good approximation of the tail of the ￿rm-size
distribution.20 However, the Pareto distribution proves to be a very restrictive choice for
our purposes. As we discussed in Section 4.3, a Pareto distribution for ￿rm productivity
implies that average export sales per exporter are constant. Thus, as trade costs fall, all of
the adjustment must occur through the extensive margin, that is, the number of exporters. 21
This exclusive role of the extensive margin is clearly at odds with the data. Instead, we favor
a more ￿exible speci￿cation that allows for both margins to be active.
Baseline  = 12  = 3
SS LH SS LH SS LH
Total Exports 52.8 55.8 52.3 54.1 23.3 23.7
Number of Exporters 20.3 6.1 20.1 6.0 7.7 2.4
Agg. Productivity 0.5 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 0.2
Table 8: Robustness analysis. All variables are growth percentage rates after a fall of 10
percentage points in trade.
Finally, we also explore some alternative parameter speci￿cations. Table 8 reports the
growth rate for exports, the number of exporters, and aggregate productivity in the event of
19See Chaney (2008), for example.
20See Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007).
21It is important to recall that we have abstracted from general equilibrium e￿ects on the wage rate, which,
in turn, could have a￿ected the ￿xed costs associated with exporting. This channel is operative in Melitz
(2003) and leads to adjustment along the intensive margin.
22a trade cost reduction of 10 percentage points for both the strict sorting (SS) and the latent
heterogeneity (LH) model. In addition to the baseline calibration, we consider two alternative
parameterizations. In the ￿rst, we set the elasticity of substitution between exports to 12.
There is no signi￿cant change for both models’ predictions for the growth rate of exports
and exporters, but there is now virtually no aggregate productivity growth. This shows that
the ￿love of variety￿ e￿ect is the main driver of aggregate productivity. We also look at a
second parametrization with a very low price elasticity of aggregate exports. Naturally, total
trade growth is smaller as demand does not react to the fall in costs. Interestingly aggregate
productivity displays similar gains.
6 Some Theories of Heterogeneity
6.1 Small exporters
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2007) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) report that
a large fraction of exporters actually sell very little abroad. These small exporters are at
odds with the basic Melitz model. As we discussed, the smallest exporter should be larger
than more than 80% of the ￿rms. Assuming that foreign sales are proportional to total sales
among exporters, we would ￿nd that the smallest exporter should have foreign sales totalling
approximately $1 million.22 Instead, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2007) report that more
than 75% of all exporters sell less than $1 million abroad.
Arkolakis (2008) develops a theory of market penetration that e￿ectively introduces con-
vex market access costs for foreign sales. Exporters with relatively low productivity sell very
little abroad as the cost of reaching more consumers exceeds marginal revenue. Larger ￿rms,
capable of more net revenue per sale, serve most of the consumers abroad and thus behave
(approximately) as in the standard Melitz model. Thus, export intensity is increasing with
size. We note that while the model in Arkolakis (2008) can explain the presence of exporters
with small exports, it does not explain why some small ￿rms export and some large ￿rms
do not. In other words, the strict sorting in total sales between exporters and non-exporters
is preserved.
Our ￿rst observation is that, as long as the strict property is preserved, variation in
export intensity cannot reconcile the model with the data. The simplest way to see this is to
compute the exporter size premium in terms of domestic sales under strict sorting, following
the same procedure we did with total sales. We report the results in Table 9. Excluding
foreign sales does not reduce the disparity between the data and model. This is perhaps not
surprising given that foreign sales are a small fraction of total sales for the U.S.
We also note that small exporters arise naturally once we introduce latent heterogeneity.
A small ￿rm may export despite its low productivity if it draws a small ￿xed cost. Such a
22The export intensity, that is, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales per ￿rm, is on average 14% among
exporters. Under strict sorting, the smallest exporter’s total sales is just below $5 million.
23Data Model
Ave. Domestic Sales - NX $8.1 million $740,000
Ave. Domestic Sales - X $31.3 million $60.3 million
Exporter Size Premium 3.8 81.5
Table 9: Exporter size premium in terms of domestic sales.
￿rm will export little, since it will not be competitive abroad. We use the ￿tted distribution
in Section 3 as well as a constant export intensity of 14% in order to generate a distribution
of export sales. We ￿nd that, under latent heterogeneity, over a quarter of exporters sell
less than $50;000 abroad. Recall that under the strict sorting model the smallest exporter
would have about $1 million in foreign sales. Thus latent heterogeneity goes a long way
in explaining the presence of small exporters. That said, many exporters sell a very small
amount in the data￿e.g., less than $20;000. For the latent heterogeneity to match this,
we would need even more variation in the latent variable. However, such a small amount
suggests that a fraction of exporters are ￿rms that are not actively selling in a foreign market
but rather they just ful￿ll the occasional order coming from abroad.
6.2 Industry-level heterogeneity
Here we explore whether the latent heterogeneity stems from between-industry variation.
Manufacturing includes goods as diverse as tobacco products and machinery. So it is quite
reasonable to think that sectors face very di￿erent trade costs, both ￿xed and variable. If the
required heterogeneity is present at a very aggregate level, then we may be able to capture
it with a simple two-sector speci￿cation, with a tradable and a non-tradable sector. 23
More generally, we compute the size premium implied by strict sorting for each three-
digit NAICS industry code. The procedure is the same as the one we used in Section 2 for
manufacturing as a whole. Bernard et al. (2007) report the share of ￿rms exporting in each
sector for 2002. As noted by Bernard et al. (2007), there is a large variation in the share
of exporters. In Printing only 5% of the ￿rms exports, while in Computers and Electronic
Products almost 40% of the ￿rms do. We also have the summary of the distribution of total
sales for each sector￿as in Table 1￿provided by the Census.
Table 10 reports the size premium as predicted by strict sorting for each three-digit
NAICS code. We compute a lower bound by assuming that all ￿rms within any given size
bin are identical; we also report a point estimate based on a ￿tted Pareto distribution.
Both deliver the same message: for each sector the predicted size premium is very large.
The reason is that the ￿rm size distribution within a sector remains very skewed, so any
strict sorting exercise is bound to return large size premia. The di￿erences on the share of
exporters does create a lot of variation in the implied size premiums across sectors. However,
23This is often done in open macroeconomic models in other to replicate home bias or deviations from the
law of one price.
24Size Premium Prediction
Industry NAICS code Share Exporters Lower Bound Estimate
Food 311 .12 115.3 118
Beverage and tobacco 312 .23 193.7 246
Textile mills 313 .23 49.6 69
Textile product mills 314 .12 57.6 68
Apparel 315 .08 55.8 56
Leather 316 .24 38.8 43
Wood product 321 .08 30.2 32
Paper 322 .24 48.7 53
Printing 323 .05 41.0 43
Petroleum and coal 324 .18 164.4 165
Chemical 325 .36 100.7 176
Plastics 326 .28 30.9 31
Nonmetallic mineral 327 .09 36.2 38
Primary metal 331 .30 69.9 70
Fabricated metal 332 .14 28.0 45
Machinery 333 .33 33.0 43
Computer and electronic 334 .38 72.4 97
Electrical equipment 335 .38 48.3 67
Transportation equipment 336 .28 190.5 298
Furniture 337 .07 48.4 50
Miscellaneous 339 .02 87.8 88
Aggregate Manufacturing 31-33 .18 81.2 95
Table 10: Lower bound for size premium predictions, by industry.
it does not get them in the range observed in the data. As we saw in Table 3 the skewness
in total sales is such that even if exporters were way more common than actually observed,
the implied size premium would remain very large.
6.3 Sunk Costs
So far we have considered sources of variation in the export decision in a static framework.
However, it is well known that the data display a fair amount of export hysteresis, which
provides support for the presence of sunk costs. 24 While we are not concerned with the
dynamics of exporting per se, export hysteresis has important implications for the cross-
24Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) are credited with developing the ￿rst theories of
export hysteresis. Roberts and Tybout (1997) evaluate empirically the role of sunk costs through reduced-
form models. More recent work has estimated structural models with sunk costs; see Das et al. (2007) and
Ruhl and Willis (2008).
25section of exporters. In the presence of sunk costs, the exporter status of a ￿rm is not
determined by its current productivity alone. An exporter may have no reason to stop
exporting for productivity level ', since it can still cover the per period ￿xed costs. The same
productivity level, though, may not be high enough to convince a ￿rm to start exporting
as it will not cover the sunk costs. Indeed, there seems to be a basis for this possibility.
Alessandria and Choi (2007b, 2008) calibrate models of sunk export costs that match the
size and share of exporters, as well as the distribution of ￿rm size in manufacturing. In these
papers, though, there are many other sources of heterogeneity, so the quantitative role of
export hysteresis in explaining the cross-sectional facts is not clear.
It is thus possible that the history of each ￿rm provides the necessary heterogeneity to
match the exporter size premium. A full analysis of this hypothesis is beyond the scope
of this paper. We include here a simple exercise that suggests that sunk costs can explain
the share and size of exporters but only by shifting the size ￿puzzle￿ from exporters to new
exporters.
Consider the following variation of the reduced-form model in Section 3. Firm i’s total
sales at date d, denoted rid, are an iid random variable, with distribution 	r. Since we
do not evaluate the model at any frequency, the lack of any persistence is not particularly
worrisome and allows for an easy characterization. There are two thresholds, t0 and t1 with
t0  t1, that determine the transition in and out of the foreign market as follows:
 An exporter at date d   1 exports at date d if rid  t0 .
 A non-exporter at date d   1 exports at date d if rid  t1 .
All readers familiar with sunk cost models will recognize the thresholds t0 and t1 as the
stopper and starter points.
We now brie￿y show how we map the observations on the share and size of exporters,
given the distribution of total sales, to pin down the stopper and starter points. The ￿rst
equation to use is the steady-state condition on the share of exporters. Clearly, a fraction
	r (t0) of previous exporters exit the exporter market, while a fraction 1   	r (t1) of the
previously non-exporters start exporting now. If the share of exporters is constant, we must
have that
sx = (1   	r (t0))sx + (1   	r (t1))(1   sx): (17)
With some manipulation we have that equation (17) gives the share of exporters as a function
of the starter and stopper points,
sx =
1   	r (t1)
1   	r (t1) + 	r (t0)
: (18)
Note the measure of exporters between t0 and t1 is simply (	r (t1)   	r (t0))sx, so their
proportion among exporters themselves is just 	r (t1)   	r (t0). We can then compute the
average total sales by exporters as
x = (	r (t1)   	r (t0))E frjr 2 [t0;t1]g + (1   	r (t1) + 	r (t0))E frjr  t1g: (19)
26We then solve for the two equations (17) and (19), with t0 and t1 as the two unknowns.
We have no problem ￿nding values for t0 and t1 that match the share and size of exporters.
As simple as the set-up is, we can actually compute the entry and exit rates. We ￿nd
that both are quite small (2:5% and 11:5%, respectively) indicating that there is a lot of
persistence in the export status of the ￿rm. Unfortunately, it is di￿cult to compare the
numbers with the data, since we did not specify at what frequency the model is operating.
Given our assumption that total sales are iid, we should take a period to be at very least
￿ve years. At that frequency the exit rate is very low compared with the data, as Bernard
and Jensen (1999) report an annual stopper rate of 17%.25
While the sunk cost model breaks the strict sorting between exporters and non-exporters,
it now features strict sorting between new exporters and non-exporters. Because the entry
rate is so small, the threshold for entry is way deep in the tail of the distribution (the 98th
percentile to be precise). The size premium between new exporters and non-exporters is
thus even larger, in the neighborhood of 200. All empirical evidence points to new exporters
being signi￿cantly smaller than existing exporters￿so it looks like to reconcile the sunk cost
model with the size of new exporters we will need, again, a lot of independent variation in
the entry decision.
6.4 Relaxing independence
We return to our ￿tting exercise from Section 3 and drop the assumption that the latent
variable ti is independent of ￿rm size. Some ￿rm characteristics￿e.g., managerial quality,
geographical location￿may simultaneously a￿ect total sales and the costs associated with
exporting. We do not pursue any particular hypothesis. Instead, we will explore what kind
of correlation between total sales and the latent variable would reduce the size-independent
variation needed to match the data.
We now allow for total sales and the latent variable fri;tig to be jointly distributed
according to a log-normal distribution with mean  and variance-covariance matrix . We
parameterize the joint distribution in terms of the latent variable:
log(ti) = 
 log(ri) + log(i)
where i is independent of total sales ri and distributed according to a log-normal distribution
with mean  and standard deviation . The parameter 
 governs the correlation between
total sales ri and the latent variable ti.
It is easy to rewrite the model in terms of total sales ri and independent variation i.
Firm i exports if
ri  ti
or, in logs and in terms of i,
(1   
)log(ri)  log(i):
25The rate is for U.S. establishments in the period 1984-1992.
27Given a value for 
 we can proceed as we did in Section 3 to ￿nd values for  and  such
that the model matches the share and size of exporters observed in the data. 26
We ￿nd that total sales and the latent variable have to be positively correlated in order
to reduce the amount of variation independent of ￿rm size, that is, 
 > 0. The reason is
quite straightforward. Strict sorting overestimates the size of exporters. Having larger ￿rms
clear, on average, a higher hurdle to start exporting reduces the number of large ￿rms that
export. There is then less need for the size-independent variable i to take large values with
high probability.
A positive correlation between ￿rm-size and the latent variable questions the hypothesis
that ￿rms face ￿xed costs associated with exporting. A more natural explanation is that
domestic and export production both require some input that is on a ￿xed supply at the
￿rm level. For example, each ￿rm may be endowed with one manager with a limited span of
control, as in Lucas (1978). For ￿rms with higher labor productivity, the opportunity cost
of the manager’s control is higher.
It should be made clear that the positive correlation does not rule out non-convexities
but rather suggests that they require a more nuanced approach. For example, Cooper and
Haltiwanger (1993) assume that ￿rms face some down time when replacing ￿machines￿ or,
more generally, when pursuing some investment such as upgrading the production process.
The non-convexity arises because it is not possible to replace, say, a fraction of a machine
with a fraction of the down time. The down time is more expensive for more productive
￿rms, so while the investment technology is identical across ￿rms, the cost of investment is
higher for larger ￿rms.
Another possibility is that large ￿rms face di￿erent market conditions than small ￿rms.
For example, the fair wage literature links the wages paid with the ￿rm’s pro￿tability. 27 If
the overhead costs of exporting are in terms of in-￿rm labor, then more productive ￿rms
would face a higher cost of exporting.
26Let log(hi) = (1 
)log(ri). Given 
 and the distribution of total sales 	r, we can derive the distribution




Similarly, the size premium is related to the log di￿erence in hi between exporters and non-exporters:
(1   
)E flog(ri)jri  tig =
Z
log(h)	 (h)d	h (h)=sx:
27The literature dates back to Akerlo￿ (1982). It has been recently introduced in international trade. See
Amiti and Davis (2008), for example.
286.5 Heterogeneity in trade costs and foreign demand
So far we have explored some hypothesis for the large amount of size-independent variation
needed to match the data on the size and share of exporters. We have not, though, explored
the implications of these hypotheses in the event of a trade liberalization. Perhaps our
results in Section 5 are tied to the assumption that ￿xed costs explain all of the variation
in the data. An obvious alternative is that ￿rms have heterogeneous trade costs or there is
￿rm-market demand heterogeneity, since perhaps foreign consumers do not value quality as
domestic consumers do.28 Since foreign sales are a small fraction of total sales for U.S. ￿rms,
heterogeneity in trade costs or foreign demand would be essentially independent of size.
We ￿nd that the model implications are virtually unchanged if the necessary size-independent
variation is modeled as heterogeneous ￿xed costs, trade costs, or foreign demand. 29 It is easy
to see why this is the case. First, if the additional heterogeneity enters the exporter revenues
multiplicatively, then the resulting model is actually isomorphic to heterogeneity in ￿xed
costs. The reason is that the model is essentially loglinear. Consider this simple speci￿ca-
tion: on top of the trade costs , the marginal cost of ￿rm’s ! exports is (1 +  (!)) times
more than the marginal cost for output sold at the domestic market. That is, ￿rms di￿er on
the variable costs associated with exporting.




















We could, though, simply de￿ne ~ f (!) = f (!)(1 +  (!))
 and the equilibrium condition is
identical.30 Quantitatively we would calibrate the distribution of both  and f to reproduce
the variation in the latent variable￿in other words, we would calibrate the variable ~ f (!)
as we did with f (!) in Section 4. So as long  and f remain independent of ', the results
would be unchanged.31
We do not expect big di￿erences even if the conditions for the isomorphism do not apply.
Say we consider ￿rm variation in the trade costs per unit, that is, the marginal cost of a
￿rm is now  (!) + w='(!). In this case the entry condition (11) is not loglinear. We can,
28Munch and Nguyen (2008) ￿nd that ￿rm-speci￿c factors such as productivity explain a very small
fraction of the sales variation across destinations for Danish exporters.
29As long, of course, as the full amount of latent heterogeneity is captured by the speci￿cation of choice.
30This requires, of course, that the additional heterogeneity is normalized such that it does not change the
baseline calibration or the policy experiment.
31The source of heterogeneity will make a di￿erence in a general equilibrium model or in the computation
of the transition dynamics. We are skeptical, though, that the di￿erences will be economically signi￿cant.
29though, think of a nth order log-approximation to (10) around the representative ￿rm type,
~ !. The higher order terms may be important for large reductions of trade costs: they are,
though, only on the measure that the variation  interacts with the productivity parameter,
'. This interaction is not captured by the latent variable in Section 3￿so non-multiplicative
factors a￿ect results only on the measure that they induce departures from the assumption
of linear independence.
7 The Extensive Margin in the Data
The empirical literature has not come to a consensus on the quantitative importance of the
extensive margin for aggregate trade patterns. This re￿ects, in part, that there is no unique
concept of the extensive margin: one can de￿ne entry and exit at the level of the ￿rm, plant,
or product.
Two papers are well known for arguing that the extensive margin is an important di-
mension of aggregate data. Hummels and Klenow (2005) ￿nd that the extensive margin
accounts for 60% of the cross-country di￿erences in trade. Broda and Weinstein (2006) ￿nd
large welfare gains associated with the expansion in import variety for the U.S over the last
three decades. Both papers build upon the analysis in Feenstra (1994) and share a focus on
the long run.
In our exercise we have used the measure of the extensive margin in Alessandria and Choi
(2008) so we take some time to discuss their results. Using the census of manufacturers,
Alessandria and Choi (2008) look at the increase in export participation by plants and ￿nd
that it accounts for half of the export growth in the U.S. from 1987 to 2002. Interestingly,
this is quite close to the prediction of the standard Melitz model for the extensive margin.
We cannot ignore, though, that the standard version of the model allocates an important
role to the extensive margin only by greatly exaggerating the economies of scale.
Recently, several papers have taken the position that the extensive margin contributes
little to aggregate trade patterns. Besedes and Prusa (2008) argue that new exporting
relationships have little impact on long-run export growth because they tend to be very
short-lived. Arkolakis et al. (2008) document a sizeable increase in variety in Costa Rica
from 1986 to 1992. They argue, though, that the increase did not translate into large welfare
gains because new varieties were imported in small quantities. Armenter and Koren (2008)
show that several well-known facts about the extensive margin are the result of the sparsity
of the data.
Summarizing, there is no de￿nitive evidence of the quantitative importance of the ex-
tensive margin in the determination of aggregate trade patterns. While we may record
much activity along the extensive margin￿say, many new products are exported in a given
year￿this does not necessarily translate into aggregate patterns￿either because these new
products are dropped the next year or they constitute a very small fraction of total exports.
308 Conclusions
Since Melitz (2003), models with economies of scale and ￿rm-level heterogeneity have become
very popular in international trade. These models have been used to explain the character-
istics of multi-product exporters and exporters-importers, among others. Most researchers
are content to show that the qualitative predictions are as documented in the data.
In this paper we have shown that a simple Melitz model cannot match quantitatively
the basic cross-sectional facts about exporters, namely, their frequency and size. The model
can be easily reconciled with the data by introducing enough additional sources of variation.
However, this is not without implications. First, we need a large amount of independent
variation, suggesting that ￿rm size is not the main determinant of the export status of a
￿rm. Second, the augmented model has a minor role for the extensive margin in the event of
a trade liberalization, and the productivity gains due to reallocation of resources are smaller
than in the standard model.
Given the attention the literature has given to the extensive margin, it is quite surprising
that the calibrated version of the Melitz model features only small changes in export partic-
ipation which, in addition, contribute little to overall trade growth. This ￿puzzle￿ appears
quite robust: the source of variation at work does not seem important. In order to generate
relatively small exporters, one needs to assume that larger ￿rms face signi￿cantly larger costs
of exporting, which seems at odds with the concept of ￿xed costs.
We ￿nd the ideas in Melitz (2003) compelling enough to ask what can reconcile the data
with a model of economies of scale in exporting. In our opinion such a model would need
to move beyond the assumption of ￿xed costs and take a more nuanced look at how the
economies of scale arise. We should also ask whether we are measuring export participation
correctly. One particular hypothesis of interest is that the Melitz model ￿ts well the behavior
and characteristics of large exporters, but the facts on the extensive margin are driven by a
set of small exporters. Since most exports are made by large exporters, Melitz (2003) would
be the right framework from a macroeconomic perspective.
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Figure 1: The extensive margin
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Figure 2: Aggregate Exports Trade costs decrease in percentage points. All variables in
growth rates























Trade costs decrease −∆τ%
Export Price Index Pf
Figure 3: Aggregate Exports - Comparison with the Representative Firm Model Trade costs
decrease in percentage points. All variables in growth rates
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Figure 4: Entry and Employment Growth by Exporters Trade costs decrease in percentage
points. All variables in growth rates
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Figure 5: Aggregate Productivity Trade costs decrease in percentage points. All variables in
growth rates
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Figure 6: Exporters Trade costs decrease in percentage points. All variables in growth rates
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